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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
Case No. 
-vs- : 14371 
ROBERT ROMERO, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary 
and theft in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty of theft and 
burglary by a jury before the Honorable Peter F. Leary. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully seeks an affirmance of 
the lower court decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 15, 1975, Russell and Jennifer Habeck 
left their apartment. Upon returning they found that 
their television, stereo and an antique scale had been 
stolen from their apartment (R.ll). Russell Habeck 
testified that the stolen articles were valued in 
excess of $500 (R.9-10). At the trial Mary Juarez, 
the Habeck!s next door neighbor, testified that she 
saw the defendant enter the Habeck1s home and carry out 
stereo equipment and put it in a van. Mary Juarez was 
able to identify the defendant because she had met him 
and seen him in the neighborhood several times (R.39-41). 
Another neighbor, Connie Walters, also testified 
that she saw the defendant enter the home and carry away 
stereo equipment. Ms. Walters was able to identify the 
defendant by choosing his photograph out of a total of 
40 pictures shown to her by the police (R.57-62). 
Both eyewitnesses testified that the defendant 
made several trips to and from the Habeckfs apartment, 
carrying things and putting them into the van. At no 
time did the Habeckfs give authority to anyone to enter 
their home (R.10). 
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prima facie case plaintiff must 
present some evidence of every 
element needed to make out a 
cause of action.5 252 P.2d at 
o n'""-: 
^h,:> necessary elements to GG proved in the case 
"Burglary " " " A person 
is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains in a building with the 
intent to commit a theft or a felony 
or commit an assault on any perser." 
Utah Code An- - ?^ ^ ^norM no . 
as amended. 
"Theft. A person commits 
theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control of property 
of another with the intent to 
deprive him thereof." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended. 
The evidence introduced by the State which makes 
out the prima facie case is as follows. Russell Habeck 
testified that property valued in excess of $500 was stolen 
from his home (R.9-10). He also testified that he had not 
given authority to anyone to enter his home (R.10). Mary 
Juarez, an eyewitness, testified that she saw the defendant 
enter the home of the Habecks and carry out several items 
(R.39-41). Connie Walters, another eyewitness, also 
testified that she saw the defendant enter the home and 
carry away the stolen items (R.57-62). 
Such evidence was sufficient to at least take 
the case to the jury for determination* 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS CLEARLY 
SUFFICIENT THAT REASONABLE MINDS ACTING FAIRLY UPON IT 
COULD HAVE FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
This Court in State v., Allgood, 2 8 Utah 2d 119, 
499 P.2d 269 (1972), set forth the standard upon which 
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this Court will review a jury verdict to determine whether 
or not there was sufficient evidence presented in the lower 
court to convict the defendant. This Court said: 
"To set aside a jury verdict 
the evidence must appear so incon-
clusive or unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly 
upon it must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that defendant 
committed the crime." Id. at 
269-270. 
This standard was reaffirmed in State v. Mills, 
530 P.2d 1272 (1975), where this Court stated further: 
"Unless the evidence compels 
such a conclusion as a matter of 
law the verdict must be sustained. 
In evaluating the evidence, is it 
so inherently improbable as to be 
unworthy of belief, that, upon 
objective analysis it appears 
reasonable minds could not believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt the 
defendant was guilty?" IdL at 
1272, 1273. 
This Court, in accord with long established 
precedent, has held it will not review the sufficiency of 
evidence as to the rectitude of an appellant's conviction 
unless there is a clear showing that the evidence could not 
support the conviction. State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 
350 P.2d 146 (1960). 
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There is a strong presumption attached to the 
validity of the trial court judgment and every reasonable 
intendment must be indulged in support of such judgment, 
until and unless the complaining party can demonstrate the 
error of such judgment. 
In State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 
196 (1967), this Court said: 
"It is our duty to respect 
the prerogative of the jury as the 
exclusive judges of the credibility 
of the witnesses and as the determiners 
of facts. Consequently, we assume that 
they believed the statefs evidence, and 
we survey it, together with all fair 
inferences that the jury could reasonably 
draw therefrom, in the light most favor-
able to their verdict." Id. at 197. 
In the instant case, there is no affirmative showing 
that conviction waS obtained without sufficiency of evidence. 
The grounds raised by the appellant cannot be sustained either 
on the basis of the presumption or clearly demonstrated by 
the record. 
In the instant case, the victim Russell Habeck 
testified that he had certain property in his home which was 
stolen (R.ll). Mr. Habeck valued the property at a bare 
minimum of $550 (R.9-10). Mary Juarez, a next door neighbor 
of the victim, testified that she saw the defendant carrying 
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the stolen property from the Habeck home. She was able to 
recognize the defendant because she had previously met his 
acquaintance (R.39-41). She stated, "I know him very well, 
I recognize him right away." (R.94). 
Another eyewitness, Connie Walters, who lived a 
few houses down, testified and described the same people 
and the same stolen articles which the first eyewitness, 
Mary Juarez, testified to. Connie Walters was able to 
identify the defendant by choosing his picture from among 
a total of 40 pictures altogether (R.57-62). It is clear 
from the record that there was sufficient evidence whereby 
the issue was properly submitted to the jury and that the 
jury acting fairly and reasonably upon the evidence could 
have found, as it did, that the appellant was guilty of 
the crimes of burglary and theft. 
Appellant contends that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt because of 
the credibility of the statefs two eyewitnesses. It has 
been long established that it is the prerogative of the 
jury to judge the weight of the evidence, the credibility 
of the wintesses and the facts to be found therefrom. 
State v. Mills, supra. 
-7-
The jury can find not only facts directly proved 
by the evidence but any additional facts which are reasonable 
inferences of the facts proved* State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 
313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964). 
Therefore, appellant's claim of insufficient 
evidence based upon the credibility of the state's two eye-
witnesses is totally frivolous and without merit. Respondent 
submits that the evidence presented at trial was clearly 
sufficient that reasonable minds acting fairly upon it could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT III 
IF IT APPEARS THAT THE JURY ACTING FAIRLY AND 
REASONABLY COULD FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT, THE VERDICT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
For the defendant to prevail on an assertion of 
insufficiency of evidence: 
" . . . it must appear that 
viewing the evidence and all fair 
inferences reasonably to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favor-
able to the jury's verdict, reason-
able minds, could not believe them 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but would necessarily entertain 
some substantial doubt of their 
guilt." State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 
110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957) . 
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Also, it is settled that a jury verdict will not be 
reversed merely because reasonable minds may have had 
a reasonable doubt or that conflicting inferences might 
have been drawn from the evidence. As stated in the 
Sullivan case: 
"But it is not sufficient 
merely that reasonable minds may 
have entertained such doubt. 
Before a verdict may properly 
be set aside it must appear that 
the evidence was so inconclusive 
or unsatisfactory that reasonable 
minds acting fairly upon it must 
have entertained reasonable doubt 
that defendants committed the 
crime." 302 P.2d 212. 
Finally, this Court in State v. Lamb, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d 
805 (1942), said: 
"It is not our province on 
appeal to judge the credibility of 
witnesses when their testimony is 
in direct conflict. We are concerned 
only with the question of the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the convictions by showing that the 
jury could have found beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendants were 
guilty." 131 P.2d at 809. 
Thus, it can be seen that the verdict of the jury 
will be given great weight, and it will only be reversed if 
it is shown that there is no evidence upon which it could 
reasonably be based. In the instant case it is clear from 
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the record that there was sufficient evidence to support 
the jury verdict and therefore it should not be disturbed• 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that there 
was sufficient evidence whereby the issue was properly 
submitted to the jury and that the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably upon the evidence could have found, as it did, 
that the appellant was guilty of the crimes of burglary 
and theft. 
The respondent further submits that this Court 
should not disturb those findings of fact and should 
affirm the conviction of the appellant as adjudged in 
the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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